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Hospital networks: How to make them work in Belgium? Facilitators and 
barriers of different governance models 
 
Objectives: This study aims to identify the facilitators and barriers to governance models of 
hospital collaborations. The country-specific characteristics of the Belgian healthcare system 
and legislation are taken into account.  
Methods: A case study was carried out in six Belgian hospital collaborations. Different types 
of governance models were selected: two health systems, two participant-governed networks, 
and two lead-organization-governed networks. Within these collaborations, 43 people were 
interviewed. 
Results: All structures have both advantages and disadvantages. It is important that the 
governance model fits the network. However, structural, procedural, and especially contextual 
factors also affect the collaborations, such as alignment of hospitals’ and professionals’ goals, 
competition, distance, level of integrated care, time needed for decision-making, and legal and 
financial incentives.  
Conclusion: The fit between the governance model and the collaboration can facilitate the 
functioning of a collaboration. The main barriers we identified are contextual factors. The 
Belgian government needs to play a major role in facilitating collaboration.  
 
Keywords: hospital networks, governance, collaboration, policy, management 
 
This study has been conducted according in accordance with the Guideline for Good Clinical 
Practice and the Declaration of Helsinki for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects. 
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Introduction 
The number of collaborations between Belgian hospitals has increased over the last decade. 
Following the new regulation guidelines in the action plan of the Minister of Social Affairs and 
Public Health (April 2015),1 hospitals must become part of a larger care collaboration, where 
they will need to join forces to better coordinate and integrate patient care across hospital 
boundaries and enhance task distribution. Examples of such a collaboration and task 
distribution include a concentration of highly-specialized services, such as rare cancer 
treatment, in reference centres,2,3 or the rationalization of general care services such as 
maternity services.  
Following the current Belgian Hospital Act three types of collaboration between hospitals exist: 
an association (collaboration between two or more hospitals aimed at the joint exploitation of 
one or more care programs, hospital departments, or functions), a group (collaboration between 
hospitals with agreements on task distribution and complementarity on the level of services, 
disciplines, and equipment, in order to meet the needs of the population and to improve quality 
of care) and a merger (the most far-reaching form of hospital collaboration since it involves 
two or more hospitals joining as one hospital with a single administrator). Each type of 
collaboration is strictly defined with very strict rules allowing only a low level of flexibility 
(See also Table 1).4 The basic principles of the action plan were operationalized in a vision 
statement of the minister in October 2016,5 and the first version of the new legislation is being 
discussed at the time of writing. New governance models are needed to support these hospital 
collaborations, as the current traditional forms of collaboration are no longer sufficient, and 
several other forms of collaboration are emerging in a bottom-up matter.4 However, the way in 
which collaborations tend to develop in a country depends not only on the governance in 
interhospital collaborations; it is the intertwined role of governance, processes, and structures 
that drives a collaboration. External factors, such as the macrolevel mechanisms used to 
coordinate the healthcare system, also affect the governance of hospitals and hospital 
 3 
collaborations.6 This study aims to identify the facilitators and barriers to the governance of 
hospital collaborations. The country-specific characteristics of the Belgian context are taken 
into account.  
 
Method 
Case selection 
Six Belgian hospital collaborations were investigated. The collaborations were selected based 
on the type of governance structure, according to the classification of Provan and Kenis7—that 
is, a health system, a participant-governed network, or a lead-organization-governed network.7 
A ‘lead organization’ structure is characterized by a dominant organization in the network that 
takes responsibility for the governance. In a ‘participant-governed’ network structure, there is 
no separate governance entity, and governance remains the responsibility of each organization 
in the network.7 A health system is a more integrated governance structure, in which more 
hierarchical control is applied, meaning that a central board is in charge of overall 
coordination.8 The other selection criteria were region, language, size, and willingness to 
cooperate.  
 
Data collection 
A case-study design was selected in order to explore the barriers and facilitators of the different 
governance models for supporting collaboration. This design is appropriate for exploring ‘how’ 
and ‘why’ questions about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little 
or no control.9  
Site visits were organized for each case. These included encounters with key informants, such 
as board members, presidents or representatives of medical councils, chief executive officers 
(CEOs), chief medical officers (CMOs), and network coordinators or managers. A 
semistructured interview guide with key questions was used. This helped to define the areas to 
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be explored, but also allowed the interviewer or interviewee to diverge to pursue an idea or 
response in more detail. The site visits were complemented by telephone interviews (e.g., when 
key informants were not available during the site visit) and emails (e.g., to obtain additional 
information). Encounters with physician representatives and administrators were organized 
separately, in order to avoid social acceptance bias. Field notes were taken during the site visits, 
and audio recordings were made of all conversations with key informants, with the consent of 
the interviewees. In addition, the relevant documents, such as collaboration agreements, were 
consulted where possible. This gathering of multiple sources of evidence made the conclusions 
more accurate.  
NVivo 11.010 was used to analyse the transcribed interview data for the six Belgian cases. We 
coded the transcripts according to the broad themes of interest of the study and allowed in vivo 
codes to arise. Two researchers conducted the interviews together, so they could complete each 
other’s information and avoid information loss. 
 
Results 
In total, 43 people were interviewed, of which 20 were CEOs, nine were representatives of 
medical councils, eight were CMOs, three were presidents of the board, and three were network 
coordinators (one physician and two nurses). Some of the participants have an intertwined role 
as some of the CEOs were also board members and/or network coordinators. The length of the 
interviews depended on the participant (e.g., first interview for the particular case) and on the 
interview method (e.g., face to face versus by phone). On average, the interviews lasted one 
hour. 
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Governance models in interhospital collaborations 
The following section presents the results of the interviews. In Table 2, the goals and the 
governance models are reported for each collaboration. Table 3 provides an overview of the 
facilitators and barriers, by collaboration. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert 
Table 1. Collaboration forms in the current Belgian legislation 
Table 2. Description of cases 
Table 3. Facilitators and barriers  
about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Barriers and facilitators 
Facilitators  
Depending on the characteristics, goals, and governance model of a collaboration, different 
facilitators were identified. Expertise and knowledge transfer are among the main drivers to 
collaboration. For example, if the two lead organizations have a great deal of expertise in 
specific clinical domains, the credibility of the collaboration is strengthened and the number of 
hospitals that will want to join the collaboration may increase. Another type of expertise 
identified is the transmural, crossdomain experience in health systems. Expertise from different 
types of service providers, such as elderly care institutes, home care, psychiatric care, and 
general practitioners can be shared to ameliorate task distribution and improve the level of 
integrated care. Moreover, the well-known brand of a large collaboration can facilitate the 
visibility of individual organizations and their engagement as an important stakeholder in 
governmental decisions. 
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Participants in lead organizations and health systems underline the benefits of more integrated 
and central governance structures. Central governance enhances the processes of decision-
making and coordination, and creates more time for strategic choices. However, interviewees 
in participant-governed networks emphasize the importance of their equal decision rights, 
which enhance the consensus decision-making and facilitates the level of trust. Organizations 
maintain their autonomy, which simplifies the process of entering the collaboration.  
Collaborations enable the sharing of resources and supporting services, saving costs for the 
participating organizations. This tends to be identified as an advantage of health systems in 
particular. In all cases, integrated IT systems were mentioned as a crucial resource for sharing 
patient information. However, this remains still a challenge.  
 
Barriers 
The various medical councils and boards in a collaboration complicate the process of decision-
making, making it more time consuming. In lead-organization-governed network 1, for 
example, there is a network board and a common medical committee. However, most decisions 
need the approval of the medical councils of the individual hospitals. This shows the importance 
of the alignment of goals between different parties and hospitals. In some cases, managers and 
physicians do not always agree on strategic goals, with the medical council sometimes holding 
back the progress of the collaboration. Moreover, because of their therapeutic freedom, 
physicians can choose who they collaborate with and may refer to other partners outside the 
collaboration.  
Conflicts do not occur only between different groups of professionals, but also between 
different hospitals. Due to the large scale and the more centralized governance structures of 
health systems, small hospitals in such structures feel less involved in the process of decision-
making. On the other hand, large hospitals sometimes feel impeded by the smaller organizations 
in a collaboration. In addition, more centralized governance structures make it hard for 
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members to leave a collaboration. Organizations that are entering such a collaboration often 
fear losing their autonomy and decision-making rights. This was identified as a barrier in one 
health system and in the lead-organization-governed networks. Both lead organizations are 
therefore aiming to evolve to a participant network to equalize decision-making rights. 
The complex legal and financial structures in Belgium also complicate collaboration. Due to 
the legislative system, which has federal and regional government aspects, the legislative 
regulations a collaborations are very complex. The regional authorities are responsible for all 
authorizations, for example, for care programs and collaborations, but these must be in line with 
the federal programming standards. Moreover, financial barriers also exist. The hospital budget, 
called the budget of financial means (BFM), is paid to the legal entity running the hospital. 
Although theoretically possible (via a specific Royal Decree granting a BFM directly to the 
hospital collaboration concerned), in practice, collaborations are currently not entitled to a 
BFM, even if they have their own legal entity (e.g., a not-for-profit association). This is 
considered an important barrier to collaboration in all cases. Although one of the cases is a not-
for-profit association (with its own balance sheet), the income of the main activity of the 
collaboration has to be part of the balance sheet of one of the hospitals in order to obtain a BFM.  
There are also many problems related to the payment of medical staff and the related 
regulations. Physicians referring for a collaborating hospital receive no financial benefits at the 
moment because of the predominant fee-for-service system.11 In other words, they do not 
receive payments for sending a patient to another care provider, except where physicians’ 
income is pooled and redistributed. Second, when physicians work at multiple hospitals, they 
may be working under different terms, as different agreements regarding the deduction of 
physician’ fees can exist in different hospitals. Third, it is unclear whether deductions to 
physician’ fees can be collected in a collaboration rather than at a single hospital. Fourth, 
physicians working in several hospitals lose their voting power in medical council elections 
which also restricts their possibility to be appointed in advisory boards such as the medical 
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pharmaceutical committee, the committee on medical materials, etc. This restrains physicians 
to actively participate in the integration/networking process.  
Certain collaborations also require employees to work at different hospitals. This is especially 
the case for more integrated systems that aim to transfer personnel from one organization in the 
collaboration to another, as is the case with health systems. The existing legal forms of 
collaboration between hospitals do not cover such flexible staff arrangements. In principle, a 
hospital cannot allow its own personnel to work for other hospitals in the collaboration. Lead-
organization-governed network 1, for example, solved this problem by having all employees 
and physicians in the collaboration be employed by the lead organization. 
Another challenge is the distance between hospitals. Hospitals that provide basic care services 
should be located at a manageable distance from each other. This is a challenge for both of the 
health systems. Consequently, hospitals have begun to collaborate with other hospitals outside 
of the collaboration. Distance is identified as less of a problem for more specialized services. It 
should be noted that, in some cases, distance is not really considered a problem—such as where 
the equal culture and vision of collaborating organizations is seen to be more important than 
the distance between the hospitals.  
There are also concerns related to competition. The goals and the strategies of individual 
organizations need to be aligned with the overall strategy of the collaboration. Competition 
between organizations within a network or health system can decrease the level of 
collaboration. Moreover, large collaborations can also become monopolies, undermining 
service and quality in Belgian healthcare services, as the market principle is undermined in a 
monopoly. Participants mentioned that the government should control competition between 
hospitals.  
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Discussion 
Depending on the goals of the collaboration and the governance model, the facilitators and 
barriers to collaboration differ. There is no specific governance model that suffers from many 
more problems than the others. On the one hand, participant-governed networks show the 
importance of bottom-up decision-making, which increases consensus decision-making. On the 
other hand, more integrated structures such as health systems have more time to focus on 
strategic choices. Consequently, it is important for organizations to be able to select the most 
appropriate governance model for their collaboration. In line with Provan and Kenis,7 our 
results show that the successful adoption of a given type of governance model is related to the 
characteristics of the network and the context in which the collaboration operates. This study 
shows the importance of the alignment of goals, the level of trust between the partners, the 
distance between organizations, the scale, and the type of goal.  
Contextual factors, such as problems related to VAT, (social) legislation about transferring 
employees between independent organisations in a network4 and the criteria related to the 
authorization of a hospital such as the necessity of  having a pharmacy,12 also counteract the 
formation of collaborations. Moreover, changes due to the sixth reform of the state in Belgium 
complicate the establishment of collaborations that combine different types of care because 
some types are financed at the regional level and others at the national level. This distribution 
of financing responsibility complicates integrated care initiatives such as collaborations with 
elderly care, psychiatric care, etc. Moreover, only licensed hospitals can be financed; at present 
it is not allowed to give financial resources to the collaboration. Therefore, to facilitate 
collaborations current legislation needs to be adapted to allow collaborations to be licensed, to 
receive financial resources and to appoint physicians and employees on the level of the 
collaboration. 
A mismatch between a governance model and organizational characteristics can harm 
collaboration performance.13 As such, it is important that a best fit between the collaboration 
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characteristics and the governance model is chosen to facilitate the collaboration. For example, 
there is an evolution observed in the two lead-organization-governed networks: they aim to 
evolve into participant-governed networks, as this structure is now more aligned with the goals 
of the network. It is not unusual for collaborations to evolve to other types of governance 
models.14,15 Nongovernance facilitators that have also been found important in this study 
include the sharing of resources and supporting services (which is a legal barrier at the current 
legislation e.g. pharmacy, see above), integrated IT systems, sharing of experience and 
knowledge, a well-known brand, and the alignment of goals between different parties and 
hospitals. Most of these facilitators relate to the structural characteristics of a collaboration. 
Elements of the complex governance model of collaborations—such as the different boards and 
medical councils and the scale of the collaboration—were reported as significant barriers. The 
current legislation does not motivate physicians to collaborate since they have to give up a part 
of their voting right and their possibility to be appointed in specific committees might be 
restricted. Above that, collaboration increases efficiency to a certain level, but over-large 
collaborations can be too complex to manage.16,17 The loss of autonomy makes it more difficult 
for organizations to enter an organization.  Also the geographical distance between 
organizations is identified as an important barrier. The government should also control the way 
collaborations evolve and ensure that market principles are adhered to. Finally, developing trust 
and a relationship over time is a challenge.18 Investment in a common goal and a long-term 
perspective is important for collaborations.19 
 
Conclusion 
As each governance model has its advantages and disadvantages, and an evolution in 
governance models was observed, we conclude that a fit between governance model and the 
collaboration in a certain context can facilitate the functioning of the collaboration. The main 
barriers identified were contextual factors. In conclusion, the Belgian government plays an 
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important role in facilitating collaboration and leaving room for collaborations to select their 
own governance model.  
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Table 1: Collaboration forms in current Belgian legislation 
Collaboration Legal entity Governance structure  Decision power  Additional legal requirements 
Hospital group  Creation of a new legal 
entity  
 or by contract between 
hospitals 
 Common medical committee: 
composed of representatives of 
different medical councils 
 Coordination committee: composed of 
representatives of the boards of 
different hospitals of the group. The 
coordination committee complies with 
the requirements described in the 
group agreement 
 A medical coordinator, a coordinator 
for the nursing department and a 
general coordinator have to be 
appointed. 
 Approval by the coordination 
committee of decisions regarding 
investment, the creation of new 
services or of new medico-technical 
services by the hospitals of the group 
 Authorisation depends on this approval   
 A group must comply with several 
conditions in order to be authorised 
(e.g. maximum distance of 25 km 
between hospitals) 
 Homogeneity of group services must 
be guaranteed within two years after 
signing the group contract 
Hospital 
association 
 Creation of a new legal 
entity  
 or by contract 
 Association committee: composed of 
board members appointed by each 
participating hospital. The 
composition of the committee has to be 
described in the association agreement.  
 Common medical committee: 
composed of physicians appointed by 
the different medical councils of each 
participating hospital (written 
agreement between medical councils 
of the participating hospitals).  
 Network committee: composed of the 
members of the association committee 
and the members of the common 
medical committee.  
 General coordinator, medical 
coordinator and nurse coordinator: 
appointed by the association 
 All decisions should be discussed with 
the medical council in each hospital 
 Unclear about the decision-making in 
the board, unless described in the 
statutes of the association 
 Specific requirements for an 
‘association of a care area’: (1) to 
specialise or concentrate care; (2) 
covering a minimum of 150 000 
inhabitants; (3) participating is not 
compulsory for all hospitals of the 
territory  concerned 
Hospital merger  Legal entity may 
disappear 
 creation of another 
legal entity 
 Merger plan (one  administrator, one 
CEO, one CMO, one chief nursing 
executive officer (CNO), one medical 
council for all hospitals involved 
 Board of the hospitals must ask their 
medical council to give advice 
concerning the merger plan, which is 
non-binding   
 A hospital merger must comply with 
several conditions to be authorised 
(e.g. a maximum distance of 30 km 
between hospitals)   
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 or absorption of an 
existing legal entity 
under one 
administrator with one 
single authorisation  
o Must be submitted to the minister 
responsible for the authorisation 
of hospitals 
 The merger plan must contain a 
minimum content related to the 
medical activity in het hospitals, as 
determined by act 
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Table 2. Description of cases  
Organization Description  
Health system 1  A collaboration that provides health and social care to a large population. It consists of twenty-four facilities, two of which are hospitals. 
 A not-for-profit association with one board for the collaboration, two hospital boards, executive management committees, and medical 
councils for each hospital. 
Health system 2  An intercommunal collaboration consisting of four hospitals with six hospital sites, as well as several psychiatric care facilities and 
facilities for older people. 
 The governance structure consists of one board composed of politicians from a Belgian province and the municipalities. There are no 
boards at hospital level, only medical councils and executive management committees. 
Lead-organization-
governed network 1 
 A collaboration for the purposes of radiotherapy, oncology, and haematology. It consists of seven hospitals, with one hospital as the lead 
organization. 
 A not-for-profit association and an association (cf. the Belgian Hospital Act) with a board and common medical committee.  
Lead organization- 
governed network 2 
 The main goal is to develop a sustainable knowledge network in which the joint optimization of the quality of care and the quality of 
management is ensured by sharing and valourizing the knowledge within the network. The network is a collaboration of 25 organizations. 
 A not-for-profit association consisting of a board and a medical committee. It has several clinical and administrative working groups. 
The general assembly controls the board, which oversees the activities of the executive committee. One board member of the founding 
hospital of the collaboration participates in the board of each participating hospital (sometimes with voting rights, sometimes with an 
observer role). 
Participant-governed 
network 1 
 An emerging collaboration that aims to include four general hospitals. Its goal is to provide complex specialized services within the 
collaboration (e.g., cardiac surgery). 
 There is an overarching board (with each hospital having one vote) and an executive committee, which is responsible for issues organized 
on a collaboration level. It has not yet been decided whether there should be a new medical committee on the collaboration level, or 
whether there should be a delegation of the existing medical councils.  
 There are equal decision-making rights in the overarching board. 
 The collaboration operates under an established framework agreement. 
Participant-governed 
network 2 
 There are three hospitals in the collaboration with equal decision-making rights. The goal of the collaboration is to enhance patient 
transfers and collaborations on certain care programs. 
 Each hospital board and medical council of the participating hospitals decides on strategic decisions that might impact the individual 
hospitals’ budgets. The strategic committee has ultimate responsibility for implementing the collaboration, but has no decision-making 
power over services that are still provided by the individual hospitals. The operational committee is responsible for effectively 
implementing the goals defined by the strategic committee and for achieving the objectives of the collaboration. 
 There are equal decision-making rights in the strategic committee. 
 Collaboration under an established framework agreement. 
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Table 3. Facilitators and barriers 
 Health system 1 Health system 2 Lead-organization- 
governed network 1 
Lead-organization- 
governed network 2 
Participant-governed 
network 2 
Participant-governed 
network 1 
Facilitators  Transmural, crossdomain 
experience 
 Resource-sharing and 
supporting services 
(logistics) 
 A larger budget because of 
the size and diversity of the 
organization 
 Central governance 
 More time for strategy 
 Well-known brand 
 Transmural, 
crossdomain 
experience 
 Resource sharing and 
supporting services 
(logistics) 
 A larger budget 
because of the size and 
diversity of the 
organization 
 Central governance 
More time for strategy 
 Well-known brand 
 Expertise of lead 
organization and 
knowledge transfer 
 Central governance 
 Increased 
coordination and 
decision making 
 Decision-making 
often in consensus 
 Option of evolving 
into a less centralized 
governance structure 
(with equal voting 
rights) 
 Integrated IT system 
 Expertise of lead 
organization and 
knowledge transfer 
 Central governance 
 Increased coordination 
and decision-making 
 Decision-making often in 
consensus 
 Option of evolving into a 
less centralized structure 
(equal voting rights) 
 Integrated IT system 
 High trust between partners 
 Equal partnership 
 Autonomy 
 Bottom-up decision-making 
 Alignment of the goals of 
physicians and managers 
 High trust between partners 
 Equal partnership 
 Autonomy 
 Bottom-up decision-making 
Barriers  Large scale sometimes 
decreases effective decision-
making and efficiency 
 Distance between hospitals 
may complicate task 
distribution 
 Small hospitals feel less 
involved in the decision-
making process 
 Barrier to new organizations 
entering this large 
collaboration, since 
governance is performed on 
different levels and it is 
difficult to leave the 
collaboration  
 Transfer of personnel to 
other organizations is 
difficult 
 Complex financial structure 
and legislation 
 Large scale sometimes 
decreases effective 
decision-making and 
efficiency 
 Distance between 
hospitals may 
complicate task 
distribution 
 Small hospitals feel 
less involved in the 
decision-making 
process 
 Difficult to collaborate 
with hospitals outside 
the health system 
 Medical councils often 
block decisions of the 
board  
 No alignment between 
the goals of physicians 
and management 
 Complex financial 
structure and legislation 
 Still some competition 
within the network 
 The central position 
of one lead 
organization is 
sometimes a barrier 
to new organizations 
joining the 
collaboration 
 Explicit approval of 
each individual 
hospital’s medical 
council is needed 
 Transfer of personnel 
to the collaboration 
from the individual 
organizations 
 Physicians lose 
voting rights by 
working in different 
collaborations 
 Complex financial 
structure and 
legislation 
 The central position of 
the lead organization is 
sometimes a barrier to 
new organizations joining 
the collaboration 
 The size of the network is 
a barrier to new hospitals 
entering 
 Achieving agreement 
between all partners takes a 
long time, since they all 
have the same voting right 
 Complex governance 
 Lack of agreement 
 Physicians lose voting 
rights by working in 
different collaborations 
 Transfer of personnel to 
other organizations is 
difficult 
 Complex financial structure 
and legislation 
 Different deductions on 
physicians fees 
 Achieving agreement 
between all partners takes a 
long time, since they all 
have the same voting right 
 Complex governance 
 Lack of agreement 
 Physicians lose voting 
rights by working in 
different collaborations 
 Transfer of personnel to 
another organization is 
difficult 
 Complex financial structure 
and legislation 
 Different deductions on 
physicians fees 
 
